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MARKETS AND MORALS: THE LIMITS OF 
DOUX COMMERCE 
MARK L. MOVSESIAN* 
ABSTRACT 
In this Essay on Professor Oman’s beautifully written and 
meticulously researched book, The Dignity of Commerce, I do three 
things. First, I describe what I take to be the central message of the 
book, namely, that markets promote liberal values of tolerance, 
pluralism, and cooperation among rival, even hostile groups. Sec-
ond, I show how Oman’s argument draws from a line of political 
and economic thought that dates to the Enlightenment, the so-called 
doux commerce thesis of thinkers like Montesquieu and Adam Smith. 
Finally, I discuss what I consider the most penetrating criticism of 
that thesis, Edmund Burke’s critique from tradition, which suggests 
we should be careful attributing too much to markets’ ability to 
promote liberal pluralism. According to Burke, it is the Western 
tradition, not commerce, which creates the tolerant, pluralist mar-
ketplace of the doux commerce thesis. That Burke was correct is 
suggested by several historical examples and by contemporary 
events in the United States and across the globe. That is not to say 
that Oman is entirely wrong about the potential political benefits 
of the market, only that we should be careful not to overstate them. 
                                                                                                            
* Frederick A. Whitney Professor of Contract Law and Director, Center for 
Law and Religion, St. John’s Law School. I thank Marc DeGirolami, Robert 
Delahunty, and John McGinnis, as well as my colleagues at a faculty workshop 
at St. John’s and the participants in this symposium in “Markets, Morality, 
and Contract Law” at the William & Mary Center for the Study of Law and 
Markets for helpful comments. An earlier, much abbreviated version of this 
Essay appears at the Library of Law and Liberty. Mark L. Movsesian, Is It Really 
Commercial Activity That Civilizes?, LIBR. OF L. & LIBERTY (June 26, 2017), 
http://www.libertylawsite.org/book-review/is-it-really-commercial-activity-that-civi 
lizes/ [https://perma.cc/D6NY-FTGZ]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I thank the William & Mary Center for the Study of Law 
and Markets for inviting me to participate in this symposium on 
Professor Oman’s new book, The Dignity of Commerce.1 Oman has 
written a wonderful book in the great tradition of American con-
tracts jurisprudence. He combines immense learning and sophis-
tication with a lightness of touch that makes the book a pleasure 
to read. I do not know other contracts scholarship that manages 
to address, in turn, The Merchant of Venice,2 colonial India,3 the 
Histories of Herodotus,4 the Cairo Geniza,5 the Pukhtun tribes of 
Pakistan,6 and Kaldor-Hicks “efficiency!”7 This meticulously re-
searched, thoughtful, and beautifully written book will make an 
enduring contribution to American contracts learning. 
I agree with Oman about many things. I agree, for example, 
that markets are beneficial, and that contracts and contract law are 
valuable aspects of a well-functioning society. I agree, too, that trade 
promotes wealth, social development, and even, occasionally, a 
benign indifference to certain divisive issues. Nonetheless, I find 
myself disagreeing with Oman’s central claim about the political 
benefits of markets. It is a friendly disagreement; in the end, it may 
amount to little more than a difference in emphasis. But it seems 
to me an important one. I am much more skeptical than Oman that 
commerce can have the beneficial political effects he identifies. 
In this Essay, I will do three things. First, I will describe what 
I take to be the central argument of The Dignity of Commerce, 
namely, that markets have moral worth because they promote the 
liberal values of tolerance, cooperation, and pluralism.8 Second, I will 
show that Oman’s argument draws on a line of thought that dates 
back to the Enlightenment, the so-called doux commerce thesis of 
thinkers like Montesquieu and Smith.9 Finally, I will address what I 
                                                                                                            
1 NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (2016). 
2 See generally id. at 1–8, 183. 
3 Id. at 29. 
4 Id. at 34–35. 
5 Id. at 30. 
6 Id. at 44–45. 
7 Id. at 68–69. 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 18–23. 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 54–79. 
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consider the most penetrating critique of that thesis—and, there-
fore, Oman’s argument—namely Edmund Burke’s critique from tra-
dition, and explain why it seems to me correct. We should be careful 
attributing too much to markets’ capacity to promote liberal plu-
ralism.10 Indeed, in my opinion, current events at home and abroad 
demonstrate the limits of the doux commerce thesis, and do so 
rather decisively.11 
I. THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE 
The Dignity of Commerce is an ambitious book. Oman covers 
most major topics in contemporary contracts scholarship, includ-
ing efficiency and distributive fairness;12 adhesion contracts and 
unconscionability;13 contract remedies;14 contracts against public 
policy;15 and, of course, consideration.16 At heart, though, the book 
attempts to answer the fundamental question of contract law, the 
one that precedes all the others: why should the law enforce con-
tracts in the first place?17 Why, with respect to some promises—for 
the law could not enforce all promises; that would be unworkable— 
should courts require the promisor either to perform or pay dam-
ages? What makes the enforcement of contracts legitimate and not 
the arbitrary exercise of state power over one citizen at the insis-
tence of another? 
Oman maintains that the law should enforce contracts be-
cause contracts undergird commerce—and commerce promotes good 
politics.18 More specifically, commerce promotes the liberal vir-
tues of tolerance and cooperation necessary for pluralist politics.19 
Oman’s argument is thus a moral one.20 Contracts are morally 
good because they facilitate markets, and markets are morally 
good because they promote values essential for liberalism and 
                                                                                                            
10 See infra text accompanying notes 105–14. 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 167–92. 
12 See generally OMAN, supra note 1, at 67–85. 
13 See generally id. at 133–59. 
14 See generally id. at 112–32. 
15 See generally id. at 160–81. 
16 See generally id. at 89–111. 
17 See id. at 16. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. at 19, 43–49. 
20 Id. at 15 (“Markets are good because as a social practice they produce certain 
outcomes that we should regard as morally desirable.”). 
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pluralism.21 (That liberalism and pluralism are themselves mor-
ally good is taken as a given). Of course, classical liberalism and 
pluralism are related.22 In fact, they mutually reinforce one an-
other: classical liberalism promotes pluralism, and pluralism, in 
turn, promotes classical liberalism.23 But Oman tends to analyze 
the two concepts separately. 
Start with classical liberalism. Markets, he maintains, “gen-
erate a set of moral habits—virtues—that support a liberal politi-
cal order.”24 Markets encourage us to see things from other people’s 
points of view.25 You cannot sell customers something if you do not 
understand what they want or need (or think they want or need).26 
This ability to consider alternative perspectives and offer persuasive 
appeals for our own position is essential to the reasoned deliber-
ation liberalism requires.27 Markets also “weaken loyalty to tribe 
and family,” thus promoting our “ability to relate to strangers ac-
cording to impersonal criteria,” another quality essential for clas-
sical liberalism.28 And, finally, markets promote equality rather 
than inherited status, a goal of liberalism from the start.29 
Relatedly, markets allow us to adapt to the pluralism that per-
vades modern life—the unavoidable, continuing contact with people 
who have competing, often opposing, lifestyles and commitments.30 
Markets, Oman argues, “provid[e] a mechanism by which those with 
sharply differing religious, moral, and political beliefs can peacefully 
                                                                                                            
21 Id. at 15–16. 
22 See generally id. at 40 (discussing how well-functioning markets support 
liberalism which, in turn, provides a framework for pluralism). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 19. 
25 Id. at 44. 
26 Oman has made this argument more recently elsewhere as well. See Nathan 
B. Oman, Doux Commerce, Religion, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 
92 IND. L.J. 693, 710–11 (2017) [hereinafter Oman, Doux Commerce]. 
27 OMAN, supra note 1, at 46 (“It is only by acquiring the ability to see the 
world through the eyes of another that effective political cooperation is possible. 
This is precisely the skill demanded of a successful trader.”). 
28 Id. at 43. 
29 Id. at 43–44 (“[M]arkets break down aristocratic habits, encouraging peo-
ple to relate peaceably as equals.”). On liberalism’s goals with respect to equality 
and inherited status, see PATRICK J. DENEEN, CONSERVING AMERICA?: ESSAYS 
ON PRESENT DISCONTENTS 160 (2017). 
30 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 40 (discussing “the pervasive pluralism of contem-
porary society”); id. at 51 (noting that “moral pluralism” is “[o]ne of the hallmarks of 
modern society”). 
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cooperate.”31 Markets promote trust between strangers, including 
strangers from rival and hostile communities.32 Repeated exchanges 
in the marketplace, over time, can reassure us that others also 
value fidelity and fair dealing, whatever their racial, religious, or 
sexual identities.33 The market thus trains people to put deep, in-
tractable differences aside—to look the other way—in the interests 
of closing the deal.34 In the long run, looking the other way allows 
people to build relationships of trust they otherwise would not 
have had.35 Even if such relationships do not form, learning to 
look the other way allows us all to avoid conflicts and get on with 
our lives with a minimum of disturbance.36 
Finally, Oman maintains, markets are morally good be-
cause they produce wealth.37 “[M]oney answereth all things,” the 
Bible says.38 Money certainly helps alleviate many social prob-
lems, including, as Oman powerfully argues, deficiencies in public 
health.39 “Wealth ... tends to improve conditions for marginalized 
members of society,” like women, whose “access to formal legal 
rights closely correlates with a society’s wealth.”40 In global terms, 
commerce has contributed greatly to the growth in countries’ 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since World War II.41 The effects 
of international trade in promoting wealth, and thus social welfare, 
are especially pronounced in the parts of the developing world 
that have opened themselves up to global markets.42 
                                                                                                            
31 Id. at 19. See also Nathan Oman, Indiana and Doux Commerce, LAW & 
RELIG. F. (April 3, 2015), https://lawandreligionforum.org/2015/04/03/Indi 
ana-and-doux-commerce/ [https://perma.cc/5LLT-6ZB7]. 
32 OMAN, supra note 1, at 30. See also id. at 173 (“[T]he interaction with [a 
restaurant waiter] may be morally valuable, bringing me into positive and pro-
ductive contact with a stranger outside of my ordinary tribal circle.”). 
33 Id. at 58. 
34 See id. at 56 (noting that markets encourage participants “to put aside 
political, moral, or religious concerns when engaged in market transactions”). 
See also id. at 58. 
35 Id. at 58. 
36 Id. at 56. 
37 See generally id. at 58–66. 
38 Ecclesiastes 10:19 (King James). 
39 OMAN, supra note 1, at 64. 
40 Id. 
41 See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 521–22 (2000). 
42 Id. 
 
2018] MARKETS AND MORALS 455 
In these moral benefits of markets, Oman finds answers for 
many enduring puzzles in contract law. For example, in the great 
consideration debate—that attractive nuisance for contracts 
scholars—Oman’s appreciation for markets causes him to favor 
the bargain requirement.43 If the point of contract law is to facili-
tate market transactions, and, indirectly, good politics, then bargain 
should naturally mark out the domain of enforceable promises.44 
In fact, he maintains, market promises should be enforceable even 
in the absence of a classical quid pro quo.45 And the moral benefits 
of markets lead him to be somewhat skeptical of attempts to reg-
ulate transactions through doctrines like unconscionability and 
voidness for public policy.46 It is far better, he says, for the state 
to regulate social ills like inequality directly, than to forbid entire 
categories of commercial transactions.47 
Oman recognizes that not all markets have good moral con-
sequences.48 “Pernicious” markets, he writes, do not deserve legal 
protection.49 The Atlantic slave trade was a market, but it was a 
moral horror.50 Likewise, the state may need to intervene where 
a market systematically excludes whole classes of people, as in 
the Jim Crow South.51 And Oman recognizes that the market may 
colonize non-commercial areas of life where it does not belong—
such as marriage and family—ruining many human relationships 
by reducing them to arm’s length bargains.52 The law should take 
care to avoid this danger, Oman says, and resist attempts to apply 
the market metaphor indiscriminately to all human interactions.53 
II. THE DOUX COMMERCE THESIS 
As Oman acknowledges, his argument for the beneficial po-
litical effect of markets goes back a long way in Western political 
                                                                                                            
43 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 90. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 161. 
47 See id. at 180–81. 
48 Id. at 160. 
49 Id. at 160, 167. 
50 Id. at 163, 168. 
51 See id. at 25. See also Oman, Doux Commerce, supra note 26, at 716–17. 
52 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 173–75. 
53 Id. at 173–74. 
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thought, to the doux commerce thesis of the Enlightenment.54 The 
thesis is most closely associated with French philosophes like 
Montesquieu and Voltaire, but Scottish Enlightenment figures like 
Smith and Hume also endorsed it.55 The thesis—the phrase usu-
ally translates into English as “gentle” commerce, though “gentle” 
does not fully capture the meaning—holds that commerce tends 
to civilize people; to make us more reasonable and prudent; less 
given to political and, especially, religious enthusiasm; more reli-
able, honest, thrifty, and industrious.56 
Nowadays, we think of market benefits mostly in terms of 
the wealth creation that comes through the division of labor and 
comparative advantage.57 But the doux commerce theorists focused 
on the market’s political benefits—principally three, all interre-
lated.58 First, commerce facilitates stable government by promoting 
the virtues that make it possible. Although it rewards risk-taking, 
Montesquieu wrote, commerce also depends on constancy and 
thrift.59 The merchant must be diligent, foresighted, and careful 
to avoid needless expense; he must be orderly and reliable. As an 
example, Montesquieu offered the port city of Marseille, whose 
barren territory precluded other pursuits and “made its citizens 
decide on economic commerce” as a way of life.60 Their vocation 
required the Marseillais to be “hardworking in order to replace 
                                                                                                            
54 See id. at 43. The doux commerce thesis has sparked a voluminous litera-
ture through the centuries, both pro and con. For good introductions to the thesis, 
and the classical critiques of it, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS OF MARKET 
SOCIETIES AND OTHER RECENT ESSAYS 105–41 (1986) [hereinafter HIRSCHMAN, 
RIVAL VIEWS]. See also ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS 
59–63, 70–81, 100–13 (1977) [hereinafter HIRSCHMAN, PASSIONS]. 
55 See, e.g., HIRSCHMAN, PASSIONS, supra note 54, at 60, 70–81 (discussing 
Montesquieu); id. at 100–13 (discussing Smith); HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra 
note 54, at 109 (discussing Hume); Oman, Doux Commerce, supra note 26, at 713 
(discussing Voltaire). 
56 See, e.g., HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 54, at 43 (discussing 
meaning of “doux commerce”); HIRSCHMAN, PASSIONS, supra note 54, at 59 (not-
ing the difficulty of translation). 
57 See, e.g., McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 41, at 521 (describing theory 
of comparative advantage). 
58 See HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 54, at 41–43 (explaining that 
doux commerce theorists perceived political benefits of commerce). 
59 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 340–41 (Anne M. Cohler et al. 
trans. & eds., 1989) [hereinafter THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS]. 
60 Id. at 341. 
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that which nature refused them,” and “frugal,” too, “in order to 
live always by a commerce that they would the more surely pre-
serve the less it was advantageous to them.”61 
To the Enlightenment mind, commerce’s capacity to pro-
mote stability made it far superior to other pursuits, especially the 
quest for glory and domination—associated most strongly with the 
aristocracy—which inevitably led to political violence and ruin.62 
Christianity had shown itself unequal to the task of curbing the 
lust for glory, Enlightenment thinkers believed, but the market 
would succeed.63 In economist Albert Hirschman’s words, “the 
steady, if self-centered pull of commercial interests would serve 
more efficiently as a brake on passionate behavior than the tradi-
tional appeals to reason, duty, morals, and religion.”64 Commerce, 
Adam Smith maintained, would train people in habits of pru-
dence, “the most useful” of all the virtues.65 Although not “a hero,” 
the prudent man was “dependable and decent[;]” importantly, he 
minded his own business.66 This image of the merchant as a 
peaceable and reliable, if somewhat distant, neighbor is consistent 
with Samuel Johnson’s famous observation that “[t]here are few 
ways in which a man can be more innocently employed than in 
getting money.”67 
Second, commerce promoted the tolerant attitudes that made 
liberalism and pluralism possible, most especially, the willingness 
to ignore religious differences and cooperate peaceably as citizens.68 
After decades of religious wars in Europe, Enlightenment think-
ers were eager to divorce religion from civil life (in this, they have 
been perhaps too successful, but that is a subject for another essay), 
and they perceived that the market, which distributed rewards and 
punishments irrespective of belief, could provide a mechanism for 
doing so. The most famous example of this kind of thinking appears 
                                                                                                            
61 Id. 
62 HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 54, at 40. 
63 See id. at 38. 
64 Id. at 40. 
65 DENNIS RASMUSSEN, THE PROBLEMS AND PROMISE OF COMMERCIAL SO-
CIETY: ADAM SMITH’S RESPONSE TO ROUSSEAU 119 (2008) (quoting Adam Smith, 
THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1790)) (“prudence [is] ‘of all the virtues 
that which is most useful to the individual’”). 
66 Id. at 120. 
67 JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 242 (1791) (Bergen Evans 
ed. 1952). 
68 Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 177 (2014). 
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in Voltaire’s observations on the Royal Exchange of London, from 
his Philosophical Letters (1733): 
Take a view of the Royal Exchange in London, a place more ven-
erable than many courts of justice, where the representatives 
of all nations meet for the benefit of mankind. There the Jew, 
the Mahometan, and the Christian transact business together, 
as though they were all of the same religion, and give the name 
of Infidels to none but bankrupts; there the Presbyterian con-
fides in the Anabaptist, and the Churchman depends upon the 
Quaker’s word. At the breaking up of this pacific and free as-
sembly, some withdraw to the synagogue, and others to take a 
glass. This man goes and is baptized in a great tub, in the name 
of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; that man has his son’s fore-
skin cut off, and causes a set of Hebrew words—to the meaning 
of which he himself is an utter stranger—to be mumbled over 
the infant; others retire to their churches, and there wait the 
inspiration of heaven with their hats on; and all are satisfied.69 
The market would train people to think of religious commitments 
as incidental concerns that one could not allow to impede cooper-
ation on other, more important and productive activities.70 This 
education in benign indifference would be very useful for liberal 
politics as well. 
Finally, commerce trained people in the habits of reciproc-
ity and fairness, if for no other reason than to maintain a reputa-
tion for these things, which has definite cash value.71 A merchant 
must make himself known to others as cooperative and reliable, as 
someone who gives as well as receives value. To be perceived as an 
opportunist who takes unfair advantage of his customers, or who 
renders little in return for trade, is poisonous to long term commercial 
success. Eighteenth-century writer Samuel Ricard described it: 
Sensing the necessity to be wise and honest in order to succeed, 
[the merchant] flees vice, or at least his demeanor exhibits decency 
                                                                                                            
69 VOLTAIRE, THE WORKS OF VOLTAIRE, VOL. XIX (Philosophical Letters) 
(1733), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/voltaire-the-works-of-voltaire-vol-xix-philo 
sophical-letters [http://perma.cc/MX69-BHPE]. 
70 See RASMUSSEN, supra note 65, at 17 (“Following Locke, [the philosophes] 
argued that what is needed is less a citizenry that practices the ancient or Christian 
virtues than industrious individuals who help increase their society’s standard 
of living ....”). 
71 See, e.g., id. at 121–22 (discussing Smith’s understanding of the importance 
of reputation in a commercial society). 
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and seriousness so as not to arouse any adverse judgment on the 
part of present and future acquaintances; he would not dare make 
a spectacle of himself for fear of damaging his credit standing ....72 
Centuries later, the German sociologist Georg Simmel would suggest 
that commerce could even promote a kind of social empathy, since 
it encouraged businessmen to identify with their customers in order 
to sell them things.73 The key point is that commerce encourages 
people to be other-regarding in a way that abstract religious and 
moral commitments cannot and, thus, promotes the social harmony 
necessary for stable politics.74 
According to the doux commerce thesis, the benefits of com-
merce were not limited to domestic politics. Internationally, too, 
commerce was thought to promote harmony by creating networks 
based in nations’ reciprocity and mutual interest.75 “The natural 
effect of commerce is to lead to peace,” Montesquieu wrote.76 “Two 
nations that trade with each other become reciprocally dependent; 
if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling, 
and all unions are founded on mutual needs.”77 In fact, the more 
self-confident versions of the doux commerce thesis predicted a 
peaceful global civilization grounded in trade. Commerce “is a pa-
cific system, operating to cordialize mankind, by rendering nations, 
as well as individuals, useful to each other,” Thomas Paine de-
clared in The Rights of Man (1792).78 “If commerce were permit-
ted to act to the universal extent it is capable, it would extirpate 
the system of war .... The invention of commerce ... is the greatest 
approach towards universal civilization, that has yet been made 
by any means not immediately flowing from moral principles.”79 
                                                                                                            
72 HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 54, at 108. 
73 See GEORG SIMMEL, CONFLICT AND THE WEB OF GROUP AFFILIATIONS 61–62 
(Conflict, Kurt Wolff trans. 1955). See also HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 
54, at 121 (discussing Simmel). 
74 For more on how commerce promotes “other-regardingness,” see OMAN, 
supra note 1, at 44–46. 
75 SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 59, at 338. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN, COMMON SENSE, AND OTHER POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 265 (Mark Philp ed. 1995). 
79 Id. at 266. 
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The doux commerce thesis drew criticism at the time, and 
has done so ever since, both from the Left and the Right.80 Even 
its originators perceived weaknesses in the thesis. Montesquieu 
conceded that commerce could corrupt good morals as well as pro-
mote them—he cited Plato as authority for this, which shows how 
far back debates about the social effects of commerce go—and lead 
to what we would today call “commodification,” the tendency to 
reduce all human interactions and relationships to cash value.81 
“We see that in countries where one is affected only by the spirit 
of commerce”—he offered Holland as an example—“there is traffic 
in all human activities and all moral virtues; the smallest things, 
those required by humanity, are done or given for money.”82 The 
human impulse to generosity atrophies in commercial societies, 
he warned, as everything becomes a matter of exchange.83 By con-
trast, “hospitality, so rare among commercial countries, is notable 
among bandit peoples.”84 
Smith, too, recognized the moral dangers that lurk in com-
mercial societies.85 In such societies, he believed, people constantly 
devote themselves to “the pursuit of wealth” and, consequently, 
“have little time to undertake any activities that require great 
courage or spirit.”86 They increasingly lose interest in civic affairs 
and the capacity to defend themselves and their homes from for-
eign violence; generally, they become bad citizens.87 Commerce leads 
to inequality and promotes wasteful ostentation and useless luxury—
a later critic would call it “conspicuous consumption”—that in 
turn promotes envy and social discord.88 Most of all, commercial 
society encourages an insatiable acquisitiveness that ultimately 
contributes to people’s unhappiness, as they accumulate more and 
                                                                                                            
80 HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 54, at 110, 112. 
81 “Commerce corrupts pure mores, and this was the subject of Plato’s com-
plaints ....” SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 59, at 338. On “commodification,” 
see OMAN, supra note 1, at 170. 
82 SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 59, at 338–39. 
83 See id. 
84 Id. at 339. 
85 See RASMUSSEN, supra note 65, at 75. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 See id. at 72, 82. On conspicuous consumption, see THORSTEIN VEBLEN, 
THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 49 (1899) (Martha Banta ed. 2007). 
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more material goods in a futile effort to be contented—or, at least, 
better off than others.89 Notwithstanding these criticisms, Smith 
endorsed the doux commerce thesis, because he believed that com-
mercial societies, for all their faults, represented a great improve-
ment over the possible alternatives.90 But it is striking to see how 
much Smith shared with the great eighteenth-century critic of the 
commercial society, Rousseau.91 
Smith could have found an illustration to justify his con-
cerns about commercial society close to home. Eighteenth-century 
London—that city whose Royal Exchange so impressed Voltaire 
with its peaceable religious tolerance92—itself offered an example 
of how commerce could degrade social values, at least according 
to Samuel Johnson.93 In the Gordon Riots of 1780, Protestant 
mobs enraged by the grant of civil rights to Catholics terrorized 
the city for five days, burning Catholic churches and schools and 
the houses of prominent Catholics until the army put them down, 
at the personal order of the King, with considerable loss of life.94 
Hundreds of people were killed.95 The citizens of London famously 
did nothing to stop the rioters, a failure Johnson attributed to the 
malevolent effects of commerce.96 Where Voltaire had seen commerce 
as a civilizing force, allowing different religious communities to live 
side by side and engage in mutually beneficial projects,97 Johnson 
drew a different conclusion. Commerce, he believed, had made Lon-
doners self-absorbed and indifferent to the common good.98 The 
rioters could easily have been put down if only other citizens had 
                                                                                                            
89 See RASMUSSEN, supra note 65, at 82–88. Two centuries later, describing 
the subsequent history of the market society in the West, sociologist Daniel Bell 
put it this way: “In Aristotle’s terms, wants replaced needs—and wants, by their 
nature, are unlimited and insatiable.” DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADIC-
TIONS OF CAPITALISM 224 (1976). 
90 RASMUSSEN, supra note 65, at 12–13, 159. 
91 See id. at 51. 
92 See supra text accompanying note 69. 
93 NICHOLAS HUDSON, A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 181, 
192 (2013). 
94 ROBERT TOOMBS, THE ENGLISH AND THEIR HISTORY 359–60 (2015). 
95 PETER ACKROYD, LONDON: THE BIOGRAPHY 486 (2000). 
96 HUDSON, supra note 93, at 181, 192. 
97 See supra text accompanying note 69. 
98 HUDSON, supra note 93, at 181, 192. 
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stood up to them. But no one did. “Such,” he famously observed, 
“is the cowardice of a commercial place.”99 
III. THE BURKEAN CRITIQUE 
The arguments for and against the political benefits of mar-
kets have been recapitulated many times down the centuries.100 
It does not make sense to catalogue all the arguments here; the 
debate, it seems to me, has been fought to a draw. Each side can 
adduce evidence to support its position. Doux commerce enthusi-
asts can point to the success of trade in pulling countries out of 
poverty and in bringing together previously warring nations in new 
political unions, like the European Union.101 Skeptics can point to 
the many societies throughout history that have followed the path 
from industriousness and thrift through wealth to decadence, in-
cluding the one with which Oman begins and ends The Dignity of 
Commerce: Renaissance Venice.102 The high level of trade between 
states has not prevented violent conflicts between them and, as 
for the European Union, it is impossible to ignore the crisis it 
faces today, notwithstanding the high volume of trade in goods 
and services among the members states.103 I will return to the 
example of the European Union in a moment. 
We will not resolve the debate here. Perhaps, as Albert 
Hirschman once suggested, the doux commerce thesis is right and 
wrong at the same time: the market both promotes and corrupts 
good morals.104 I would like to spend some time, though, on what I 
think is the most powerful critique of the doux commerce thesis, a 
critique we do not often hear nowadays. It is a conservative critique, 
most closely associated with Edmund Burke, that Old Whig who has 
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come to stand for conservatism in the English-speaking world.105 
Burke’s critique should make us skeptical about commerce’s ca-
pacity to promote pluralism and liberalism where those values do 
not already exist. 
Burke favored free markets, religious toleration, and polit-
ical pluralism.106 But he did not see any of those things as inevitable, 
and he did not think free markets alone could produce the other 
two. For Burke, the doux commerce thesis had cause and effect 
backwards.107 The market does not create virtues and habits of 
mind; rather, it depends on pre-existing virtues and habits of mind, 
like law-abidingness, probity, toleration, and trust, all of which 
people bring to it from other sources—from the wider culture, and, 
especially, from religion.108 Without those pre-existing virtues 
and habits, the free market would collapse. 
The most famous example of Burke’s thinking in this regard 
comes from his Reflections on the French Revolution, which he wrote 
in 1790.109 In Reflections, Burke offered an extended critique of the 
French Revolution and the ideas that motivated it, including the 
rationalism of the philosophes.110 One mistake the philosophes made, 
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according to Burke, was to trust in abstract ideas, rather than history 
and custom, as a basis for organizing and sustaining society.111 
This mistake extended to economics, which the philosophes believed 
an independent science that could operate, of itself, to create good 
morals.112 But this was deeply wrong. The market, Burke argued, 
depended on “ancient manners,” which, in turn, depended on reli-
gious and social traditions.113 The famous passage from Reflections 
that expresses Burke’s understanding is worth quoting at length: 
We are but too apt to consider things in the state in which we 
find them, without sufficiently adverting to the causes by which 
they have been produced, and possibly may be upheld. Nothing is 
more certain, than that our manners, our civilization, and all the 
good things which are connected with manners and with civili-
zation have, in this European world of ours, depended for ages upon 
two principles; and were indeed the result of both combined; I 
mean the spirit of a gentleman, and the spirit of religion .... Even 
commerce, and trade, and manufacture, the gods of our economical 
politicians, are themselves perhaps but creatures; are themselves 
but effects, which, as first causes, we choose to worship .... Where 
trade and manufactures are wanting to a people, and the spirit of 
nobility and religion remains, sentiment supplies, and not always 
ill supplies, their place; but if commerce and the arts should be 
lost in an experiment to try how well a state may stand without 
these old fundamental principles, what sort of a thing must be a 
nation of gross, stupid, ferocious, and, at the same time, poor and 
sordid, barbarians, destitute of religion, honour, or manly pride, 
possessing nothing at present, and hoping for nothing hereafter?114 
Most conservatives today are likely to be put off by Burke’s 
praise of aristocracy—the eighteenth-century revolutions have suc-
ceeded well in that regard—but his basic point remains accessible. 
The tolerant, pluralist marketplace of the doux commerce thesis 
                                                                                                            
111 NORMAN, supra note 105, at 194; cf. KIRK, supra note 105, at 9 (discussing 
this aspect of conservative thought). 
112 KIRK, supra note 105, at 65 (“Burke knew that economics and politics are 
not independent sciences: they are no more than manifestations of a general 
order, and that order is moral.”). See also Pocock, supra note 107, at 347 (“Burke 
proposed to reverse the Scottish thesis that commerce had been the motor force 
behind the growth of manners ....”). 
113 REFLECTIONS, supra note 109, at 493. See also NORMAN, supra note 105, 
at 209 (“Commerce and business have promoted the growth of manners; but 
ultimately both commerce and politics rely on manners—that is, on the trust 
engendered by the social order.”). 
114 REFLECTIONS, supra note 109, at 493. 
 
2018] MARKETS AND MORALS 465 
is itself a “cultural artefac[t]” that cannot be divorced from the 
Western traditions that gave rise to it.115 It is wrong to think that 
markets inevitably lead to liberalism. It is the liberal tradition that 
creates the sort of marketplace Enlightenment thinkers praised. 
This critique makes a great deal of sense to me. Markets ex-
isted before the Enlightenment project began, and will exist after 
the Enlightenment project runs its course, and not all of them have 
been or will be characterized by religious indifference and plural-
ism. When I reread Voltaire’s famous description of the London Ex-
change, for example, I thought of a different anecdote from the other 
side of Europe, from many centuries earlier. Like eighteenth-century 
London, Byzantine Constantinople had a thriving economy, based 
largely in commerce.116 In late antiquity and the medieval period, 
Constantinople was perhaps the most economically dynamic city in 
the world, with astounding wealth and markets that drew traders 
from across the Mediterranean.117 
Yet, Byzantium was hardly a liberal, pluralist society, and it 
was not religiously indifferent.118 In fact, judging from contemporary 
accounts, the residents of Constantinople had a sort of mania for re-
ligious disputes.119 As theologian Timothy (now Metropolitan Kal-
listos) Ware puts it, “[t]oday, in an untheological age, it is all but 
impossible to realize how burning an interest was felt in religious 
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questions by every part of society, by laity as well as clergy, by the 
poor and uneducated as well as the Court and the scholars.”120 Here, 
for example, is a famous letter by Gregory of Nyssa, one of the fourth 
century Cappadocian Fathers, describing how difficult it was to 
engage in the simplest, quotidian transactions without having to 
debate theology: 
The whole city is full of it, the squares, the market places, the 
cross-roads, the alleyways; old-clothes men, money changers, 
food sellers: they are all busy arguing. If you ask someone to give 
you change, he philosophizes about the Begotten and the Un-
begotten; if you inquire about the price of a loaf, you are told by 
way of reply that the Father is greater and the Son inferior; if you 
ask ‘Is my bath ready?’ the attendant answers that the Son was 
made out of nothing.121 
The traders of Byzantium did not, it seems, check their religion at 
the door. 
Or consider the example with which Oman begins and ends 
his book, Renaissance Venice, the Venice of Shakespeare’s play.122 
At the time—and since—Venice offered the prototype of the com-
mercial republic, a city where people from different, and mutually 
antagonistic, religions made fortunes trading peacefully with one 
another, regardless of confessional loyalty.123 Venice was a toler-
ant, bourgeois place, indifferent to most things besides trade and 
profit.124 The city’s great wealth and culture depended on its will-
ingness to host different communities, and enforce contracts among 
them, without worrying about what Rawls would later call “com-
prehensive doctrines.”125 What an inspiration for liberalism and 
the doux commerce thesis! 
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Yet, this is only part of the story. Venice was also an in-
tensely traditional, hierarchical place.126 The city balanced devotion 
to the fluid world of commerce with an equal devotion to the static 
world of custom.127 As Peter Ackroyd explains in his marvelous 
book, Venice: Pure City, Venice was “the most conservative of so-
cieties.”128 In law and government, ancient usage had preeminent 
authority, more than positive legislation.129 Social interactions fol-
lowed patterns that did not change for centuries.130 Convention 
dictated what clothes different classes could wear.131 Patricians 
wore stiff black gowns, which highlighted gravity and authority, 
not flexibility and cosmopolitanism.132 In architecture, generation 
after generation followed old models. When buildings collapsed, 
Venetians would reconstruct them exactly as they had been, often 
using the same materials.133 Dov’era, com’era. 
And Venice was exceptionally religious. The city’s enthusi-
astic participation in the Crusades is well known, and was a matter 
of great pride for Venetians.134 Crusading was always partly a search 
for loot, of course, but for Venetians it was more than that. Vene-
tians were genuinely devout, perhaps excessively so.135 Hundreds 
of churches shared a very small space in the city; religious proces-
sions were numerous and frequent.136 Reports of miracles were 
common; only Rome had more.137 Venetians were not saints. They 
never lost sight of the main chance. But Christianity was central 
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to their identity.138 Ackroyd sums it up best: “Machiavelli wrote 
that ‘we Italians are corrupt and irreligious beyond all others.’ That 
was not true of the Venetians. They were corrupt and religious.”139 
If we want to explain what made Venice so wealthy and 
stable over centuries, then, we must take into account not only its 
devotion to commerce, but the deeply traditional nature of Venetian 
society.140 Commerce alone did not make Venice what it was; it was 
also the strong bonds of religion and custom that drew Venetians 
together and allowed them to cooperate efficiently. And commerce 
did not render Venice, in the end, a model of liberal toleration. The 
secret police were famous, and informers were everywhere.141 
Venice was a closed society, one which allowed outsiders like Jews 
to reside in the city in order to enrich it, but which did not treat 
them as equal members of the community.142 It was Napoleon’s 
army, not centuries of doux commerce, which finally put an end 
to the Venetian ghetto.143 
In this regard, I take a rather different message from 
Shakespeare’s play than Oman does. For Oman, The Merchant of 
Venice is important for what it says about the market’s role in 
promoting “the wealth and the liberal character of the city.”144 The 
play’s central dilemma, he says, is that Venice must enforce the 
contract for a pound of flesh if the city’s prosperity and way of life 
are to be preserved.145 If the city fails to honor all contracts, even 
those that give cruel rewards to foreigners like Shylock at the ex-
pense of Venetians like Antonio, its commerce will dry up, “Since 
that the trade and profit of the city / Consisteth of all nations.”146 
Foreigners will no longer trade in the city. A plot device saves the 
situation, but the message is clear: liberalism, tolerance, and the 
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profit that comes from them depend on the neutral enforcement of 
all contracts, regardless of the identity of the parties.147 
I read The Merchant of Venice differently. To me, its central 
message is that commerce cannot, in the end, obscure deep religious 
difference and promote lasting peace between rival communities. 
In his great essay on the play, “On Christian and Jew,” Allan 
Bloom uncovers the play’s essential truth: commerce promotes 
only a superficial cooperation, a surface tolerance that disappears 
at moments of crisis148: 
The law of Venice can force [Shylock and Antonio] to a temporary 
truce, but in any crucial instance the conflict will re-emerge, and 
each will try to destroy the spirit of the law; for each has a differ-
ent way of life which, if it were universalized within the city, 
would destroy that of the other. They have no common ground.149 
Only when people agree about what is most important in life can 
they be said to form a community—and doux commerce can hide 
disagreements for only so long.150 
But we do need not look to Renaissance Venice, or medieval 
Byzantium, or eighteenth-century London to perceive the limits 
of the doux commerce thesis and the truth of the Burkean critique. 
Current events offer good evidence. In the international context, 
since the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the West has made the 
expansion of liberal markets a centerpiece of its diplomacy.151 The 
so-called “Washington Consensus” promoted “democracy, free mar-
kets, and the rule of law”—the fundamentals of neoliberalism—as 
the keys to global development.152 It inspired the transformation 
of the GATT into the WTO and the creation of regional free trade 
zones like NAFTA.153 The doux commerce thesis also supported 
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the drive for “an ever closer union” in Europe.154 A single market was 
supposed to provide the foundation for a common political enter-
prise that could join together countries as diverse as the UK and 
Bulgaria and sustain a common currency for economies as different 
as Greece and Germany.155 And the doux commerce thesis inspired 
the movement to install liberal markets in places, like Russia, 
that lacked a liberal tradition.156 All these endeavors assumed that 
market liberalism would inevitably have beneficial political con-
sequences—that ethnic and national identities would recede in 
favor of pluralism, tolerance, and other liberal political values. 
Things can change, of course, but at the moment this project 
does not look like a great success.157 Liberalism and democracy are 
not experiencing triumph across the world; in fact, rather the oppo-
site.158 The movement toward global free trade has stalled.159 The 
Doha Round of trade negotiations broke down several years ago over 
disagreements between developed and developing countries (and also 
within the developed world) over agriculture subsidies, and shows 
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no sign of revival.160 As one of his first acts, President Trump with-
drew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership—Hillary Clinton 
would likely have done the same—and his supporters’ irritation 
with NAFTA helped elect him last November.161 Trump tapped 
into a long-simmering resentment among Americans who per-
ceive free trade, and the free immigration that accompanies it, as 
a threat to their livelihoods and ways of life.162 
In Europe, old national divisions have resurfaced; indeed, 
they never really went away.163 If anything, national ties seem to 
have strengthened as the EU has expanded to include countries 
outside the Western European core, and as people come to realize 
what the free movement of people actually entails.164 Following the 
Brexit referendum in June 2016, the UK triggered the formal exit 
process in March 2017.165 Significant anti-EU movements exist in 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, even Germany—and of course in 
poorer members like Greece, where 2015’s debt crisis threatens to 
break out again.166 In Russia, the attempt to create political plural-
ism through deregulation and the export of liberal markets obviously 
has failed.167 As Jesse Norman writes, Russia lacked the liberal 
traditions that make free markets work—for example, levels of 
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social trust that encourage people to deal fairly with strangers.168 
As a result, market liberalization in Russia merely “assisted the 
loss of public assets to the new oligarchs.”169 
In Burkean terms, the crisis facing the EU, and the re-
sistance to regional trade agreements like NAFTA, demonstrate 
that the doux commerce theory gets cause and effect backwards. 
Projects like the EU and even NAFTA require that people trust 
one another and feel they belong to the same community. But the 
market cannot create community where it does not already exist, 
or, to put it in opposite terms, cannot overcome divisions when those 
divisions are sufficiently deep.170 
Domestically, too, the doux commerce thesis has shown its 
limitations lately. Everyone knows about the recent clashes be-
tween LGBT couples and business owners who decline, from reli-
gious conviction, to provide services for same-sex weddings.171 
Neither side is willing to look the other way, as the doux commerce 
thesis suggests they should—neither the LGBT couples, who could 
easily find other businesses to provide the services, nor the busi-
ness owners, who could easily make money, and avoid lawsuits, by 
providing them.172 The Contraception Mandate offers another il-
lustration.173 Firms felt strongly enough about the issue that they 
were unwilling to bracket their deep convictions in order to have 
smooth commercial dealings—and people on the other side were like-
wise unwilling to forgo theirs.174 On questions like these, as Paul 
Horwitz writes, “the marketplace has become a battleground.”175 
Or take another example. In New York City, where I live, 
stores owned by Hasidic Jews got in trouble with the city’s human 
                                                                                                            
168 Id. at 285. 
169 Id. 
170 See Bloom, supra note 148, at 17; id. at 20–21 (“When men do not agree about 
what is most important, they can hardly be said to constitute a community.”). 
171 E.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. 
granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Com’n, ___ 
U.S. ___ (2017). See also State v. Arlene’s Flowers Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017); 
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willcock, 309 P.2d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 1787 (2014). 
172 For an argument that the doux commerce thesis would help participants 
avoid “intractable dispute[s]” about providing services for same-sex weddings, 
see Oman, Doux Commerce, supra note 26, at 696. See also id. at 719–32. 
173 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
174 See Horwitz, supra note 68, at 180–84. 
175 Id. at 183. 
 
2018] MARKETS AND MORALS 473 
rights commission a few years ago for requiring shoppers to “dress 
modestly.”176 “Dress modestly” apparently meant no low necklines 
on women, and some women complained that the stores were vio-
lating their human rights.177 The city eventually dropped the case, 
after the stores agreed to post additional signs stating they did 
“not discriminate on the basis of race, religion or gender,” but the 
basic point remains.178 Neither side in the dispute was willing to 
look the other way—not the storeowners, who stood to lose busi-
ness, nor the shoppers, who could have exercised old-fashioned 
market discipline by taking their custom elsewhere. Examples 
like these show the truth of Bloom’s observation.179 Where there 
are deep clashes of values—and, in twenty-first-century America, no 
clashes are deeper than those involving identity—commerce can 
do little to overcome them. 
Perhaps these controversies are outliers. But more system-
atic evidence exists of the limits of doux commerce in American 
life. Twenty-first-century America is a market society. As Michael 
Sandel observes, “[w]e live at a time when almost everything can 
be bought and sold.”180 If anywhere, you would expect the doux 
commerce thesis to bear fruit here, in our own commercial repub-
lic. Yet, notwithstanding the dominance of the market metaphor 
in our culture, levels of social trust in America are quite low.181 For 
decades, the General Social Survey has asked respondents whether 
they thought that most people could be trusted.182 In 1972, almost 
half of Americans said yes. In the latest survey, in 2016, only about 
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a third of us still said the same.183 By contrast, about two-thirds 
of Americans agreed with the statement, “You can’t be too careful 
in dealing with” others.184 Younger Americans are less likely than 
older Americans to say they trust people.185 
I have no way to know whether levels of social trust in 
America would be even lower without doux commerce. And I do 
not maintain that commerce itself has led to a decline in social trust 
in America, any more than that commerce itself has led to a rise 
in nationalism across the world. Classical liberalism generally is 
at a moment of crisis, both in the United States and abroad, and 
political pluralism seems at a breaking point.186 The decline in social 
trust in America is surely bound up with that crisis, and no doubt 
reflects many factors including, as political scientists Roberto Foa 
and Yascha Mounk maintain, a loss of faith in democracy itself.187 
But the point of the doux commerce thesis is that commerce gen-
erates trust and reciprocity and makes people comfortable cooperat-
ing with strangers on mutually beneficial projects.188 The evidence 
from the GSS suggests that is not happening in contemporary 
America189—or, if it is, it is happening to a disappointing degree. 
CONCLUSION 
Ever since Carlyle, conservatives have dismissed liberal 
economics as the “dismal science.”190 But that nickname is unfair. 
In fact, classical liberalism is profoundly optimistic, and the doux 
commerce thesis reflects that optimism. Allow people to trade 
with one another, it holds, and the results will be wealth, tolerance, 
pluralism, and a benign indifference to deep disputes that would 
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otherwise divide us. The market is, to adapt James Russell Lowell’s 
famous quote about the American Constitution, “a machine that 
would go of itself.”191 The law’s role is to support the market and 
allow it to create its considerable political benefits. What could be 
more optimistic than that? 
The Dignity of Commerce makes a great contribution to con-
tracts scholarship, and I agree with many of the points it makes. 
To the extent the book’s argument for the moral benefits of commerce 
relies on the doux commerce thesis, however, I think it too opti-
mistic. This is the crux of my disagreement with Oman: I am more 
pessimistic than he about the market’s political benefits. In fact, 
I will close with Oman’s own observation about likely responses to 
his book. It is an observation with which I wholeheartedly agree: 
To the extent that one is an optimist about the moral possibilities 
of markets, then one should be enthusiastic about the extension 
of contract law to govern larger swathes of human interaction. To 
the extent that one is more subdued in one’s assessment of mar-
kets’ moral value, then one’s view of contract law’s domain should 
be similarly limited.192 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                            
191 Laurence Tribe, Bicentennial Blues: To Praise the Constitution or to Bury 
It?, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 5 (quoting Lowell) (internal quotations omitted). 
192 OMAN, supra note 1, at 18. 
